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ABSTRACT 
Previous tests of creditor moral hazard cannot distinguish between two types of investor 
behavior: expectations of implicit guarantees or better future economic fundamentals due to a 
prospective IMF program. The novelty of our approach lies in the inclusion of the forward 
foreign exchange rate in the empirical tests of creditor moral hazard, which reflects investors’ 
expectations about the country’s future fundamentals and allows us to separate the effects of 
fundamentals from those of moral hazard. Using Indonesian financial markets as a case study, 
we first conduct tests of creditor moral hazard in the Indonesian bond and stock markets. Then, 
we use the forward exchange rate to confirm the interpretation of the bond and stock market 
results. Our results show that IMF-program related news, especially, the announcement of 
program negotiations, brings about higher stock returns and lower bond spreads, even though the 
bath sells at a forward discount on the same day. These results suggest creditor moral hazard in 
the Indonesian bond and equity markets.  
_____________________________________________________________ 
We thank Myles Wallace for his comments on an earlier version of this paper. All errors are 
ours.   1. Introduction  
This paper investigates the possibility of creditor moral hazard in bond and stock markets 
by examining the changes in sovereign bond spreads, stock market and financial sector returns, 
and forward exchange rates, in response IMF-related news in Indonesia during the East Asian 
crisis. Several observers have suggested that the Fund-support to East Asian crisis countries 
during the crisis may have provided additional implicit guarantees to investors, which would 
motivate them to take excessive risks (Edwards, 1998; Eichengreen, 2000; Feldstein, 1998; 
Friedman, 1998; Schultz et al., 1998; Schwartz, 1998). This kind of behavior is defined as the 
creditor moral hazard (Sarno and Taylor, 1999; Evrensel and Kutan, 2004a,b, and  c). 
Recent papers on creditor moral hazard focus on different financial markets: sovereign 
bond markets (Kamin and Kleist, 1999; Zhang, 1999; Lane and Phillips, 2000; Tillmann, 2001; 
Dell’Ariccia, Schnabel, and Zettelmeyer, 2002; Evrensel and Kutan, 2004a), stock markets 
(Sarno and Taylor, 1999; Evrensel and Kutan, 2004b), and financial sector stocks (Evrensel and 
Kutan, 2004c).
1 In the absence of improved fundamentals, recent studies interpret declining bond 
spreads and increasing stock market and financial sector returns as a sign of creditor moral 
hazard. However, even though it is considerably easier to estimate the changes in financial 
markets due to IMF-related news, the current research recognizes the difficulty of estimating 
investors’ expectations regarding the relevant country’s current and future fundamentals. Besides 
current fundamentals, investors also care about future fundamentals. When testing for creditor 
moral hazard, it is therefore important to capture investor expectations about future fundamentals 
in response to IMF-program news.  
The novelty of this paper lies in the inclusion of a forward-looking financial market 
instrument to capture investor expectations regarding the country’s future fundamentals. This 
paper examines the forward foreign exchange market as well to better interpret investors’ 
response in stock and bond markets to IMF-program news. We use one-month forward exchange 
rate for the Indonesian baht to infer whether investors are trading the Indonesian currency at a 
forward discount or a premium on an IMF-related announcement date. Then we compare the 
evidence obtained from the forward exchange rate with the changes in stock returns and bond 
                                                 
1 See Evrensel and Kutan (2004a and b) for a review of papers on creditor moral hazard in bond and stock markets 
respectively.   spreads. A forward discount, when combined with the evidence of higher stock returns and 
declining bond spreads, would suggest creditor moral hazard.     
  At this point, we want to discuss the characteristics of relevant financial markets used in 
this paper. For the bond market, we use a sovereign, dollar-denominated bond.
2 In the presence 
of creditor moral hazard, we hypothesize that investors would include more of these debt 
instruments in their portfolio, if IMF programs signaled implicit guarantees on their (high) 
returns. Even if a country defaults on its debt, some portion of its debt payments may be 
recovered. We assume that, everything else constant, as the probability of IMF-support increases, 
the spread on publicly guaranteed bonds declines. The negative relationship between the 
probability of an IMF-support and spreads may imply creditor moral hazard, because the IMF-
support provides the program country with funds part of which may be used by the recipient 
county to make payments to the holders of its sovereign bonds.
3  
Even though bond markets have attracted most of the attention with respect to the 
creditor moral hazard research, stock markets have also been receiving attention. As in the bond 
market, the investigation of creditor moral hazard in stock markets requires a framework in 
which creditor moral hazard takes place. Sarno and Taylor (1999) offer the very first tests of 
creditor moral hazard in equity markets, which argues that the high degree of portfolio flow 
reversibility combined with stock market bubbles is consistent with the moral hazard 
interpretation of the East Asian crisis. Based on Sarno and Taylor (1999), Evrensel and Kutan 
(2004b) construct a framework that contains various combinations of domestic implicit 
guarantees and stock market bubbles. They show that, in the presence of creditor moral hazard, 
domestic implicit guarantees or their combination with stock market bubbles are expected to 
increase stock returns. They find evidence of creditor moral hazard, but its duration is very short: 
creditor moral hazard, if exits, tends to last only for a few days. 
Financial sector represents an interesting subsection of stock markets for two reasons. 
First, many observers have emphasized the vulnerabilities of the financial sector as the primary 
source of the East Asian crisis (among others, Krugman, 1998; Stiglitz, 1999). In fact, they have 
                                                 
2 It can be argued that defaulting on its sovereign bonds would be damaging to a country’s creditworthiness, 
especially when the country is currently under an IMF program and trying to signal stability and credibility. Because 
instruments denominated in domestic currencies are subject to exchange rate risk, we use a dollar-denominated 
sovereign bond.   
3 See Evrensel & Kutan (2004a) for the assumptions regarding investor behavior and the formal derivation of the 
relationship between IMF programs and expected recovery payments.    argued that the financial sectors of the crisis countries seriously suffered from adverse selection 
before the crisis and the extension of the IMF support, which implies that financial 
intermediaries or their owners were protected by implicit or explicit government guarantees 
against losses (Krugman, 1998; McKinnon and Pill, 1997). Second, IMF funds mainly increase 
the liquidity of the program country, particularly the liquidity of the financial sector. Therefore, 
changes in financial sector returns due to IMF-related news (such as announcements of program 
negotiations and approval) may reflect investors’ expectations regarding the future performance 
of this sector due to an IMF program and the program’s credibility. We expect that, in the 
presence of domestic implicit guarantees and non-credible IMF programs, financial sector 
returns should increase.
4  
  The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the results of the GARCH 
estimations using the following three financial markets as dependent variables: bonds spreads, 
stock market and financial sector returns, and discount or premium in the forward exchange rate 
market. Section 3 provides concluding remarks.  
 
2. Empirical Analysis  
We use daily data on bond spreads, stock market and financial sector returns, and forward 
exchange rates.
5 The Indonesian spreads and US corporate bond spreads are expressed in 
percentage. Other variables such as the spot and forward exchange rates, reserves, stock market 
and financial sector returns are also computed as percentage changes in these variables, using the 
log-differenced series, multiplied by 100. All data are obtained Datastream, except the forward 
rate data, which are supplied by the Bank of Indonesia. The lack of available data on longer-term 
forward contracts forces us to use 1-month forward exchange rate data.  
We  include various IMF program dummies in our estimations. There are two 
announcement dummies (announcement of program negotiations and approval) and a window 
variable. Dummy variables take a value of 1 on the day when negotiations begin (“negotiations” 
in Table 2 and on the day when program approval is announced (“approval” in Table 2), 
                                                 
4 See Evrensel and Kutan (2004c) for a detailed discussion of the framework in which creditor moral hazard occurs 
in the financial sector.  
5 The Indonesian sovereign bond used in estimations has the following characteristics regarding the issue year, the 
interest rate, and the maturity date, respectively: 1996, 7 ¾ percent, 08/01/06.  
 respectively. We use the variable “window” to capture the uncertainty about the outcome of 
negotiations until the program announcement. This dummy variable takes a value of 1 from the 
day after the negotiations announcement until the day before the program announcement. 
Finally, the duration dummy takes the value of 1 during the IMF program and zero otherwise. 
Table 1 reports the dates associated with the announcements and the duration of programs. 
Regarding our method of estimation, we use GARCH models to account for the time-
varying volatility displayed in daily financial data. We experimented with standard GARCH as 
well as asymmetric threshold and exponential GARCH models. We found that the standard 
GARCH(1,1) fits the data much better than the asymmetric models. In all estimations, we use 
this model with Bollerslev-Wooldridge robust standard errors.  Table 2 summarizes the 
GARCH(1,1) estimations of bond spreads, stock market and financial sector returns, and forward 
discount/premium in the exchange rate. In the following, we only report the statistically 
significant results, unless indicated otherwise. 
  First, we report the results with respect to sequential creditor moral hazard, where we 
look at the performance in Indonesia’s financial markets on the days of IMF-related 
announcements in Thailand. Generally speaking, these announcements are associated with 
increased spreads, declining stock markets and financial sector returns, and expected devaluation 
in Indonesia. Even though most coefficients indicate either less than 1 percent or about 1 percent 
change in the performance of various financial markets, the declines in financial sector returns 
during the Thai-window and on the day of the Thai-program approval are 2.13 percent and 4.84 
percent, respectively. The results suggest that IMF-related announcements about Thailand 
adversely affected Indonesia’s financial markets. Therefore, we conclude that there is no 
evidence of sequential creditor moral hazard in Indonesia due to IMF-related announcements 
about Thailand. 
  With respect to Indonesia’s own IMF-related announcements, on the day of the 
negotiation announcement, we observe declining spreads and increasing stock market and 
financial sector returns, which could be interpreted as expected improved fundamentals due to a 
prospective IMF program. Especially, the increase in financial sector returns was quite high, over 
8 percent. However, the forward exchange rate was selling at a discount on this day (3.13 
percent), which indicates expected devaluation of the Indonesian currency in a month. The 
results imply that, even though investors reacted favorably to the announcement of negotiations in bond and stock markets, investors in foreign exchange markets expected devaluation in the 
future. Therefore, the results obtained from the bond and stock markets are consistent with the 
moral hazard interpretation of investor behavior. During the window, the performance of bond 
and stock markets worsened. Even though the increase in spreads was rather small (.09 percent), 
the decline in stock market returns was over 2 percent. We conclude that the results regarding the 
window period do not imply creditor moral hazard.   
  On the day of the program approval, spreads declined (.55 percent) and financial sector 
returns increased (.49 percent), which implies a positive investor response to program approval. 
Program approval may have had some surprise components in it with respect to the size and the 
conditions attached to the program. However, the surprise must have been rather small, because 
the changes in spreads and financial sector returns indicated about a half of a percent change. 
While the decline in spreads is associated with the buying activity of Indonesia sovereign bonds, 
the decline in financial sector returns implies that some investors sold their stocks. Therefore, on 
the day of the program approval, financial markets send contradictory signals. Forward exchange 
rate discount was 1.86 percent, indicating expectations of depreciation. Therefore, the result 
associated with the bond market is consistent with creditor moral hazard.  
  During the implementation of the program (duration), we observe declining financial 
sector returns (.25 percent) and marginally increasing forward exchange rate (.09 percent). The 
results associated with the variance equation indicate that there are significant ARCH and 
GARCH effects, and, therefore, time-varying volatility, except for the bond market, in which 
only the GARCH(1) term is significant. Additionally, volatility in financial markets increased 
during the program period in Indonesia. We did not include other IMF-related news in the 
conditional variance due to convergence problems in estimations. However, this should not 
affect the inferences because moral hazard effects are reflected in the mean equation.  
 
3. Conclusion  
  This paper addresses a particular problem in the analysis of creditor moral hazard 
associated with IMF-support, which is the possibility to interpret an outcome as creditor moral 
hazard, even though the outcome may have been produced by expected improved fundamentals. 
To avoid this problem, we support our results obtained from the bond and stock markets by using 
the forward foreign exchange market as a control variable. We compare our GARCH estimations of changes in bond spreads and stock market and financial sector returns due to IMF-related 
announcements with the changes in forward foreign exchange rates.  
  Our results indicate that the Thai crisis that took place before the Indonesian crisis 
adversely affected the Indonesian financial markets. On the days of the IMF-related 
announcements in Thailand, Indonesia’s bond, stock, and forward foreign exchange markets 
performed badly, as manifested in increasing bond spreads, declining stock market and financial 
sector returns, and expected depreciation of the currency, which is not consistent with the 
sequential creditor moral hazard. However, Indonesia’s own IMF-related news, especially the 
announcement of program negotiation, is associated with robust performances in bond and stock 
markets, while the forward foreign exchange market indicates the depreciation of the currency in 
a month.         
  Our paper constitutes the first attempt to control the bond and stock market results 
regarding creditor moral hazard by using an alternative, forward-looking market. Future research 
should be aimed to develop better devices to distinguish between investor behavior that implies 
creditor moral hazard and investor behavior that implies no moral hazard.  
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Table 1: Dates associated with IMF-related news and program 
duration in Indonesia 
1 
 
Announcements associated with IMF programs 
2 
 
Start of negotiations 
 
10/08/97 
Program approval 
 
11/05/97 
Program duration 
3 
 
Effective date 
 
11/05/97 
Expiration date 
 
11/04/00 
 
1 The term “program” implies standby arrangements.  
2 Dates associated with IMF-related announcements are based 
on Lane and Phillips (2000).  
3 Annual Report of the IMF in 1998 and 1999 provides the 
duration information. Effective and expiration dates imply the 
start and the end of a program respectively.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 2: GARCH estimations of sovereign bond spreads, stock market and financial sector 
returns, and forward exchange rates in Indonesia 
 
 
 Sovereign  bonds 
spreads 
 
Stock market 
returns  
Financial sector 
returns 
Forward 
exchange rate 
Constant  
 
-.0136 
(.0466) 
1 
.0419 
(.0416) 
 
.0399 
(.2636) 
0.0946 
(.0001) 
US corporate 
spreads 
 
1.4252 
(.0000) 
    
Dependent variable 
(-1) 
  .1687 
(.0000) 
.0637 
(.0046) 
0.3093 
(.0000) 
Exchange rate  
(-1)  
.0115 
(.0463) 
    
Stock returns  
(-1)  
.0056 
(.1524) 
    
Thailand 
negotiations  
.0059 
(.6759) 
-.6064 
(.0000) 
-.2339 
(.0003) 
-0.2747 
(.7072) 
Thailand 
Window
 
.0142 
(.5305) 
-1.2013 
(.0439) 
-2.1288 
(.0048) 
1.1156 
(.0027) 
Thailand  
Approval 
.0768 
(.0188) 
-1.2477 
(.6821) 
-4.8406 
(.4039) 
1.0303 
(.5844) 
Indonesia 
negotiations 
-.0807 
(.0000) 
1.5643 
(.0000) 
8.0618 
(.0889) 
3.1339 
(.0000) 
Indonesia  
Window
 
.0991 
(.0925) 
-2.1221 
(.0971) 
-.9667 
(.4511) 
-0.1636 
(.4226) 
Indonesia  
approval  
-.5453 
(.0000) 
.2337 
(.1925) 
.4846 
(.0001) 
1.8637 
(.0000) 
Indonesia  
program duration 
 
-.0042 
(.7747) 
-.1099 
(.1832) 
-.2446 
(.0589) 
0.0928 
(.1054) 
Conditional variance equation 
 
Constant .0118 
(.0285) 
.0698 
(.0008) 
.3198 
(.0007) 
0.0084 
(.0092) 
ARCH(1) 
 
.2084 
(.2753) 
.1539 
(.0000) 
.1331 
(.0000) 
0.4831 
(.0000) 
GARCH(1) 
 
.5467 
(.0002) 
.8074 
(.0000) 
.8019 
(.0000) 
0.5769 
(.0000) 
Program  
Duration 
 
.0139 
(.0856) 
.3818 
(.0026) 
.9608 
(.0126) 
0.2992 
(.0011) 
Diagnostics tests 
 
Log likelihood 
Q(10) 
 
Q
2(10) 
 
110.7215 
6.2051 
(.8594)  
.6088 
(.9999) 
-5021.317 
11.313 
(.3342) 
5.4636 
(.8581) 
-6547.869 
13.073 
(.2221) 
3.3379 
(.9723) 
-1695.5 
6.72 
(.7521) 
3.9129 
(.9512) 
Sample period  
 
12/19/96-2/27/03 01/06/92-12/27/02 01/06/92-12/27/02 12/19/96-1/19/01 
 
1 Numbers in parenthesis indicate p values.  
  
 
DAVIDSON INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER SERIES - Most Recent Papers 
The entire Working Paper Series may be downloaded free of charge at: www.wdi.bus.umich.edu 
 
CURRENT AS OF  5/03/04 
Publication Authors  Date 
No. 680: IMF-Related Announcements, Fundamentals, and Creditor  
Moral Hazard: A Case Study of Indonesia 
Ayşe Y. Evrensel and Ali M. 
Kutan 
May 2004 
No. 679: Privatization Matters: Bank Efficiency in Transition Countries  John P. Bonin, Iftekhar Hasan and 
Paul Wachtel 
Apr. 2004 
No. 678: Does Market Liberalisation Reduce Gender Discrimination? 
Econometric Evidence from Hungary, 1986—1998 
Dean Jolliffe and Nauro F. 
Campos 
Apr. 2004 
No. 677: Governance and Performance of Microfinance Institutions in 
Central And Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States 
Valentina Hartarska  Apr. 2004 
No. 676: Equilibrium Exchange Rates in the Transition: The Tradable 
Price-Based Real Appreciation and Estimation Uncertainty 
Balázs Égert and Kirsten 
Lommatzsch 
Apr. 2004 
No. 675: Productivity growth and the real appreciation of the accession 
countries' currencies 
Kirsten Lommatzsch and Silke 
Tober 
Apr. 2004 
No. 674: Exchange Rate Policy and Inflation in Acceding Countries: 
The Role of Pass-through 
Fabrizio Coricelli, Boštjan Jazbec 
and Igor Masten 
Apr. 2004 
No. 673: Is Kazakhstan a Market Economy Yet?  Getting warmer….  Sharon Eicher  Apr. 2004 
No. 672: Financial Institutions and The Wealth of Nations: Tales of 
Development 
Jian Tong and Chenggang Xu  Apr. 2004 
No. 671: Interest Rate Pass-Through in EU Acceding Countries: The 
Case of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland 
Jesús Crespo Cuaresma, Balázs 
Égert, and Thomas Reininger 
Mar. 2004 
No. 670: A minimum of rivalry: evidence from transition economies on 
the importance of competition for innovation and growth 
Wendy Carlin, Mark Schaffer and 
Paul Seabright 
Mar. 2004 
No. 669: Dual Track Liberalization: With and Without Losers  Jiahua Che and Giovanni 
Facchini 
Mar. 2004 
No. 668: Enterprise Restructuring and Firm Performance: 
A Comparison of Rural and Urban Enterprises in Jiangsu Province 
Xiao-yuan Dong, Louis 
Putterman and Bulent Unel 
Mar. 2004 
No. 667: A Tale of Two Provinces: The Institutional Environment and 
Foreign Ownership in China 
Yasheng Huang and Wenhua Di  Mar. 2004 
No. 666: Ownership Characteristics and Access to Finance: 
Evidence from a Survey of Large Privatised Companies in Hungary 
and Poland 
Natalia Isachenkova and Tomasz 
Mickiewicz 
Mar. 2004 
No. 665: Testing Creditor Moral Hazard in Sovereign Bond Markets: 
A Unified Theoretical Approach and Empirical Evidence 
Ayşe Y. Evrensel and Ali M. 
Kutan 
Mar. 2004 
No. 664: Assessing Equilibrium Exchange Rates in CEE Acceding 
Countries: Can We Have DEER with BEER without FEER? 
Balázs Égert  Feb. 2004 
No. 663: Modelling stock returns in the G-7 and in selected CEE 
economies: A non-linear GARCH approach 
Balázs Égert and Yosra Koubaa  Feb. 2004 
No. 662: Institutional Change and Product Composition: Does the Initial 
Quality of Institutions Matter? 
Johannes Moenius and Daniel 
Berkowitz 
Feb. 2004 
No. 661: Dual track liberalization: With and without losers  Jiahua Che and Giovanni 
Facchini 
Feb. 2004 
No. 660: Who Is in Favor of Enlargement? Determinants of Support for 
EU Membership in the Candidate Countries’ Referenda 
Orla Doyle and Jan Fidrmuc  Feb. 2004 
No. 659: Creditor Moral Hazard in Equity Markets: 
A Theoretical Framework and Evidence from Indonesia and Korea 
Ayşe Y. Evrensel and Ali M. 
Kutan 
Feb. 2004 
No. 658: Worsening of the Asian Financial Crisis: Who is to Blame?  Brasukra G. Sudjana and Ali M. 
Kutan 
Feb. 2004 
No. 657: European Integration, Productivity Growth and Real 
Convergence 
Taner M. Yigit and Ali M. Kutan  Feb. 2004 
No. 656: The Impact of News, Oil Prices, and Global Market 
Developments on Russian Financial Markets 
Bernd Hayo and Ali M. Kutan  Feb. 2004 
No. 655: Politics and Economic Reform in Malaysia  Bryan K. Ritchie  Feb. 2004 
 